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"United We Stand"
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Asian American Business Roundtable (AABR)
Rawlein G. Soberano. Ph.D., President
20224 Thunderhead Way Suite B
Germantown, MD 20874
Phone: (301) 601-9038
Toll Free: 1-866-215-4365 (PIN# 4766)
Fax: (301) 601-9430
Email: aabr89@aol.com
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Excerpts from
Report to the Congress on the
Situation in Iraq
General David H. Petraeus
Commander, Multi-National
Force-Iraq
10-11 September 2007
Overview
 | As a
bottom line up front, the military objectives of the surge are, in large
measure, being met…Though the improvements have been uneven across Iraq, the
overall number of security incidents in Iraq has declined in 8 of the past
12 weeks, with the numbers of incidents in the last two weeks at the lowest
levels seen since June 2006. |
|
Coalition and Iraqi forces have dealt significant blows to Al Qaeda-Iraq.
Though Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq remain dangerous, we have taken
away a number of their sanctuaries and gained the initiative in many areas. |
| We
have also disrupted Shia militia extremists, capturing the head and numerous
other leaders of the Iranian-supported Special Groups, along with a senior
Lebanese Hezbollah operative supporting Iran’s activities in Iraq. |
|
Coalition and Iraqi operations have helped reduce ethno-sectarian violence,
as well, bringing down the number of ethno-sectarian deaths substantially in
Baghdad and across Iraq since the height of the sectarian violence last
December. |
| Iraqi
Security Forces have also continued to grow and to shoulder more of the
load, albeit slowly and amid continuing concerns about the sectarian
tendencies of some elements in their ranks. |
| In
what may be the most significant development of the past 8 months, the
tribal rejection of Al Qaeda that started in Anbar Province and helped
produced such significant change there has now spread to a number of other
locations as well. |
| Based
on all this and on the further progress we believe we can achieve over the
next few months, I believe that we will be able to reduce our forces to the
pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by next summer without jeopardizing
the security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve. |
| I also
believe that it is possible to achieve our objectives in Iraq over time,
though doing so will be neither quick nor easy. |
The Nature of the Conflict
| The
fundamental source of the conflict in
Iraq
is competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and
resources. This competition will take place, and its resolution is
key to producing long-term stability in the new
Iraq.
The question is whether the competition takes place more—or
less—violently. |
Current Situation and Trends
| While
there have been setbacks as well as successes and tough losses along the
way, overall, our tactical commanders and I see improvements in the security
environment. |
| The
level of security incidents has decreased significantly since the start of
the surge of offensive operations in mid-June, declining in 8 of the past 12
weeks, with the level of incidents in the past two weeks the lowest since
June 2006 and with the number of attacks this past week the lowest
since April 2006. |
|
Civilian deaths of all
categories, less natural causes, have also declined considerably, by over
45% Iraq-wide since the height of the sectarian violence in December… [and]
by some 70% in
Baghdad.
Periodic mass casualty attacks by Al Qaeda have tragically added to the
numbers outside
Baghdad,
in particular. Even without the sensational attacks, however, the level of
civilian deaths clearly is still too high and continues to be of serious concern. |
|
The number of
ethno-sectarian deaths…has also declined significantly since the height
of the sectarian violence in December. |
|
Iraq-wide…the number of
ethno-sectarian deaths has come down by over 55%, and it would have come
down much further were it not for the casualties inflicted by barbaric Al
Qaeda bombings attempting to reignite sectarian violence. |
|
In Baghdad, the number of
ethno-sectarian deaths has come down by some 80% since December. |
|
We have, so far this year,
already found and cleared over 4,400 [weapons] caches, nearly 1,700 more
than we discovered in all of last year. |
|
Monthly attack levels in Anbar have declined from some 1,350 in October 2006
to a bit over 200 in August of this year. This dramatic decrease reflects
the significance of the local rejection of Al Qaeda and the newfound
willingness of local Anbaris to volunteer to serve the Iraqi Army and Iraqi
Police service. |
| To be
sure, trends have not been uniformly positive across Iraq…The overall
trajectory in Iraq—a steady decline of incidents in the past three months—is
still quite significant. |
| The
number of car bombings and suicide attacks has also declined in each of the
past 5 months. |
| Our
operations have, in fact, produced substantial progress against Al Qaeda and
its affiliates in Iraq…Al Qaeda is certainly not defeated; however, it is
off balance and we are pursuing its leaders and operators aggressively. |
| It is
increasingly apparent to both Coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through
the use of the Qods Force, seeks to turn the Iraqi Special Groups into a
Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against
the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq. |
| The
most significant development in the past six months likely has been the
increasing emergence of tribes and local citizens rejecting Al Qaeda and
other extremists...A year ago the province was assessed as “lost”
politically. Today, it is a model of what happens when local leaders and
citizens decide to oppose Al Qaeda and reject its Taliban-like
ideology…Other tribes have been inspired by the actions of those in Anbar
and have volunteered to fight extremists as well. |
Iraqi Security Forces
| Iraqi
Security Forces have continued to grow, to develop their capabilities, and
to shoulder more of the burden of providing security for their country. |
| There
are now nearly 140 Iraqi Army, National Police, and Special Operations
Forces Battalions in the fight, with about 95 of those capable of taking the
lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support. Beyond that, all of
Iraq’s battalions have been heavily involved in combat operations that often
result in the loss of leaders, soldiers, and equipment. |
|
Significantly, in 2007, Iraq will, as in 2006, spend more on its security
forces than it will receive in security assistance from the United States.
|
| To
summarize, the security situation in
Iraq
is improving, and Iraqi elements are slowly taking on more of the
responsibility for protecting their citizens. Innumerable challenges lie
ahead; however, Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces have made progress
toward achieving sustainable security. |
Recommendations
| The
essence of the approach I recommended is captured in its title: “Security
While Transitioning: From Leading to Partnering to Overwatch.” This
approach seeks to build on the security improvements our troopers and our
Iraqi counterparts have fought so hard to achieve in recent months. It
reflects recognition of the importance of securing the population and
the imperative of transitioning responsibilities to Iraqi institutions and
Iraqi forces as quickly as possible, but without rushing to failure.
|
| Force
reductions will continue beyond the pre-surge levels of brigade
combat teams that we will reach by mid-July 2008; however, in my
professional judgment, it would be premature to make recommendations on the
pace of such reductions at this time. In fact, our experience in Iraq has
repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not just
difficult, it can be misleading and even hazardous. |
| One
may argue that the best way to speed the process in Iraq is to change the
MNF-I mission from one that emphasizes population security,
counter-terrorism, and transition, to one that is strictly focused on
transition and counter-terrorism. Making that change now would, in our
view, be premature. We have learned before that there is a real danger in
handing over tasks to the Iraqi Security Forces before their capacity and
local conditions warrant. |
| Like
Ambassador Crocker, I believe
Iraq’s
problems will require a long-term effort. There are no easy answers or
quick solutions. And though we both believe this effort can succeed, it
will take time. Our assessments underscore, in fact, the importance of
recognizing that a premature drawdown of our forces would likely have
devastating consequences. |
| A 16
August Defense Intelligence Agency report…concludes that a rapid withdrawal
would result in the further release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq
and produce a number of dangerous results, including a high risk of
disintegration of the Iraqi Security Forces; rapid deterioration of local
security initiatives; Al Qaeda-Iraq regaining lost ground and freedom of
maneuver; a marked increase in violence and further ethno-sectarian
displacement and refugee flows; alliances of convenience by Iraqi groups
with internal and external forces to gain advantages over their rivals; and
exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics, especially with
respect to Iran. |
Excerpts from the statement of
Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker,
United States Ambassador to the
Republic of Iraq,
September 10, 2007
| My
intention today is to give you an assessment of political, economic, and
diplomatic developments in Iraq. In doing so, I will not minimize the
enormity of the challenges faced by Iraqis, nor the complexity of the
situation. Yet at the same time, I intend to demonstrate that it is
possible for the United States to see its goals realized in Iraq and that
Iraqis are capable of tackling and addressing the problems
confronting them today. A secure, stable democratic Iraq at peace with its
neighbors is attainable. In my judgment, the cumulative trajectory of
political, economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq is upwards,
although the slope of that line is not steep. The process will not be
quick, it will be uneven, punctuated by setbacks as well as achievements,
and it will require substantial U.S. resolve and commitment. |
| Iraq
is experiencing a revolution—not just regime change. It is only by
understanding this that we can appreciate what is happening in Iraq and what
Iraqis have achieved, as well as maintain a sense of realism about the
challenges that remain. |
Context
| Any
Iraqi under 40 years old—and that is the overwhelming majority of the
population—would have known nothing but the rule of the Ba’ath party before
liberation four and a half years ago. Those 35 years were filled with
crimes against humanity on every scale…[Saddam Hussein] used violence and
intimidation as tools in the complete deconstruction of Iraqi society. No
organization or institution survived that was not linked in some way to
regime protection. He created a pervasive climate of fear in which even
family members were afraid to talk to one another. |
| A new
Iraq had to be built almost literally from scratch, and the builders in most
cases were themselves reduced to their most basic identity, ethnic or
sectarian. |
| Much
progress has been made, particularly in building an institutional framework
where there was none before…The sectarian violence of 2006 and early 2007
had its seeds in Saddam’s social deconstruction and it had dire consequences
for the people of Iraq as well as its politics…It is no exaggeration to say
that Iraq is—and will remain for some time—a traumatized society. |
National Politics
| Iraqis
are facing some of the most profound political, economic, and security
challenges imaginable. They are not simply grappling with the issue of
who rules Iraq—but they are asking what kind of country Iraq will be,
how it will be governed, and how Iraqis will share power and resources among
each other. |
| Some
of the more promising political developments at the national level are
neither measured in benchmarks nor visible to those far from Baghdad. For
instance, there is a budding debate about federalism among Iraq’s leaders
and, importantly, within the Sunni community…No longer is an all-powerful
Baghdad seen as the panacea to Iraq’s problems. |
|
Similarly, there is a palpable frustration in
Baghdad
over the sectarian system that was used to divide the spoils of the state in
the last few years. Leaders from all communities openly acknowledge that a
focus on sectarian gains has led to poor governance and served Iraqis
badly. |
| We are
seeing Iraqis come to terms with complex issues not by first providing a
national framework, but instead by tackling immediate problems. |
|
Without the proclamation of a general amnesty, we see amnesty being granted,
and de-baathification reform in advance of national legislation. In both
instances, the seeds of reconciliation are being planted. |
| We see
that even in the absence of legislation there is practical action as the
central government shares oil revenues through budget allocations on an
equitable basis with Iraq’s provinces. |
| We
should not be surprised or dismayed that Iraqis have not fully resolved such
issues. Rather, we should ask whether the way in which they are approaching
such issues gives us a sense of their seriousness and ultimate capability to
resolve Iraq’s fundamental problems. |
| I do
believe that Iraq’s leaders have the will to tackle the country’s pressing
problems, although it will take longer than we originally anticipated
because of the environment and the gravity of the issues before them...They
approach the task with a deep sense of commitment and patriotism.
|
Provincial and Local Politics
| At the
provincial level, political gains have been more pronounced, particularly in
the north and west of
Iraq
where the security improvements have been in some places dramatic. In these
areas, there is abundant evidence that the security gains have opened the
door for meaningful politics. |
| Tribal
representatives are on the provincial council [in Anbar], which is now
meeting regularly to find ways of restoring services, developing the
economy, and executing a provincial budget. These leaders are looking for
help to rebuild their cities and talking of attracting investment. Such
scenes are also unfolding in parts of Diyala and Ninewa, where Iraqis have
mobilized with the help of the Coalition and Iraqi security forces to evict
al-Qa’ida from their communities. |
| Shi’a
extremists are also facing rejection. |
| Unlike
our states, Iraqi provinces have little ability to generate funds through
taxation, making them dependent on the central government for resources.
The growing ability of the provinces to design and execute budgets and the
readiness of the central government to resource them are success stories.
On September 5,
Iraq’s
senior federal leadership traveled to al-Anbar where they announced a 70%
increase in the 2007 provincial capital budget as well as $50 million to
compensate losses in the fight against al-Qa’ida. |
Economics and Capacity Building
| Iraq
is starting to make some gains in the economy. Improving security is
stimulating revival of markets, with the active participation of local
communities. War damage is being cleared and buildings repaired, roads and
sewers built and commerce energized. |
| The
IMF estimates that economic growth will exceed six percent for 2007. Iraqi
ministries and provincial councils have made substantial progress this year
in utilizing Iraq’s oil revenue for investment. The 2007 governmental
budget allocated $10 billion (nearly one-third Iraq’s expected oil export
revenue) to capital investment. |
|
Overall, however, the Iraqi economy is performing significantly under
potential. Insecurity in the countryside raises transport costs and
especially effects manufacturing and agriculture. |
Regional and International
Dynamics
| There
is expanding international and regional engagement with Iraq. In August,
the UN Security Council, at Iraq’s invitation, provided the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) with an expanded mandate through UNSCR
1770. The work of the International Compact with Iraq moves forward,
jointly chaired by
Iraq
and the UN. Seventy-four countries pledged support for Iraq’s economic
reform efforts at a Ministerial Conference in May. The UN has reported
progress in 75% of the 400 areas Iraq has identified for action. |
| Many
of Iraq’s neighbors recognize that they have a stake in the outcome of the
current conflict in Iraq, and are engaging with Iraq in a constructive way. |
| Iran
plays a harmful role in Iraq. While claiming to support
Iraq
in its transition, Iran has actively undermined it by providing lethal
capabilities to the enemies of the Iraqi state. In doing so, the Iranian
government seems to ignore the risks that an unstable
Iraq
carries for its own interests. |
Looking Ahead
| The
changes to our strategy last January—the surge—have helped change the
dynamics in Iraq for the better. Our increased presence made besieged
communities feel that they could defeat al-Qa’ida by working with us. Our
population security measures have made it much harder for terrorists to
conduct attacks. We have given Iraqis the time and space to reflect on what
sort of country they want. Most Iraqis genuinely accept Iraq as a
multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian society—it is the balance of power that has
yet to be sorted out. |
|
Whether Iraq reaches its potential is of course ultimately the product of
Iraqi decisions. But the involvement and support of the United States will
be hugely important in shaping a positive outcome. |
| I am
certain that abandoning or drastically curtailing our efforts will bring
failure, and the consequences of such a failure must be clearly understood.
An Iraq that falls into chaos or civil war will mean massive human
suffering—well beyond what has already occurred within Iraq’s borders. It
could well invite the intervention of regional states, all of which see
their future connected to
Iraq’s
in some fundamental way. Undoubtedly, Iran would be a winner in this
scenario…In such an environment, the gains made against al-Qa’ida and other
extremist groups could easily evaporate and they could establish strongholds
to be used as safehavens for regional and international operations. Our
current course is hard. The alternatives are far worse. |
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